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BOOK REVIEW
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Edited and with an introduc-

tion by Alan F. Westin. New York: Macmillan Co. 1963. Pp. 475. $7.50. At the
turn of the nineteenth century, John Randolph asked whether a judge should
not "'put off the political partizan when he ascends the tribune, or shall we have
the pure stream of public justice polluted with the venom of party virulence?' ,
The implication is that judges should not speak, ex cathedra, on public matters.
Most of us believe that it is in this tradition that our judges have operated. Alan
Westin of the Columbia faculty has constructed a book, properly styled An Autobiography of the Supreme Court, which reveals quite convincingly that at least
the justices of our Supreme Court have not been as taciturn as wemight imagine.
These pages are a collection of the out-of-Court pronouncements (speeches, articles,
memoirs, letters) of Supreme Court justices from John Marshall to Earl Warren.
The collection is preceded by an informative introduction by Professor Westin
which contrasts judicial lockjaw - the feeling on the part of the Supreme Court
judiciary that it is improper for members of the Court to speak in public about
the judicial process - with its more interesting, if more perilous, obverse. It appears from Professor Westin's account that judicial candor is quite cyclical. Thus,
as far back as Marshall's time, we find that the great federalist took pen in hand
and, writing under an honest nom de plume, i.e., a friend of the union, poured
out his heart, as doubtless many judges have wished to do before and since, against
those who impugned the motives and logic of one of his decisions. 2 It is amusing
and oddly humanizing to think of John Marshall as the pseudonymous author
of letters-to-the-editor. But he is not unique. For example, we are told that Mr.
Justice McLean, using his own name, did the same in the defense of the Court
in 1847.3 Silence and withdrawal from the limelight, of course, always interrupt
these periodic forays into public by the Court's personnel. As Professor Westin
points out, the present Court is4far less reticent in public than were its predecessors
on the Court from 1920-1940.
Unfortunately, Professor Westin does not explore what prompts the justices
to go to the public from time to time. I would suggest that the reason for these
alternate periods of sound and silence is not entirely inscrutable. Although Justice
McLean was an abolitionist by personal belief, he wrote in defense of Supreme
Court rulings concerning that bane of northern abolitionism, the fugitive slave
laws, much as the contemporary court has rallied against attack by southern
segregationists. Three years ago, Justice Douglas wrote a letter to The Reporter
attacking an article which had declared that the division in the Court between'5
the four and the five had led each bloc to "suspect the good faith of the other."
If one takes a hard look at these occasional nonjudicial pronouncements of the
Justices concerning the Court, there is no mystery as to why the judges "go to
the country." In the main, they do so when they feel that the Court or its members
need explication or defense. The fusion of personality between the Court and the
justices has continued unabated from the Marshall to the Warren Court.
This book is dedicated to Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter and proof of the
editor's affections is not limited to the dedication. Of four hundred and twentyfour pages spanning the years from 1790-1962, no less than one hundred and
eighteen of these pages are written by Felix Frankfurter. This fact in itself heavily
weights the book in favor of the moderns, with particular emphasis on the justices
who have come to the Court since the thirties. Of course it is possible to be only
as representative as one's material will permit. But even in terms of that limitation
1 Quoted in text at 15.

2 Id. at
3

77.
Id. at 19.

4 Id. at 29.
5 Cited in id. at 33.
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I wonder if this book would not have been more faithful to its title as an autobiography of the Court if an occasional Frankfurter piece had been exchanged
for that of some lesser known justice of an earlier time. For example, I notice
from Professor Westin's interesting selected bibliography of out-of-Court pronouncements of the justices from 1790 to 1962 that there is a speech extant by
John Campbell to the Alabama Bar Association in 1884.6 John Campbell served
on the United States Supreme Court from 1853-1861. Campbell, who was well
regarded as a judge in his own day,7 is quite generally unknown today. He resigned from the Court in 1861 when Alabama left the Union, although he had
quite conscientiously worked until that time to keep his state from seceding. Would
it not have been better to have given us some idea of the mind of a southern jurist
like Campbell whom we know not at all in lieu of one of the pieces by Frankfurter whom we know so well?
These reservations aside, the Frankfurter material is certainly absorbing. It is
moderately ironical to note that even Justice Frankfurter, who finds it as difficult
to stop talking about the Court as Don Quixote did about Dulcinea Del Toboso,
has misgivings about speaking publicly on Supreme Court matters. Thus at a student meeting at Harvard Law School in 1962, Frankfurter is quoted as having
said: 8
I do not want to talk about any matters connected with the Supreme
Court. I do not like to give mutilated or partial comment. I don't like to
comment on things as to which I cannot fully lay bare my mind.
Justice Frankfurter, as evidenced by the selections in this book, has managed to
surmount his inclination to abstinence with regard to talking about the Court for

which we, as well as future historians, may well be thankful. His perceptions have
the stamp of accuracy. In discussing how one can predict what kind of a justice
a man will make, Frankfurter points out the enormous insignificance of a man's

party label as a guide. He documents this assertion by one fact that speaks volumes:
James C. McReynolds and Louis D. Brandeis were both Democrats.9 This insight
underscores the acuity of the observation of other students of the Court that the
best clue to a man's future judicial behavior is shown neither by his clients, nor
his party, but rather by the books in his library. 0 Frankfurter is an exponent of
the transforming quality of the Court. And this is a theme concerning which
he tirelessly gathers materials. He writes: "
It is a very interesting thing, but Edward D. White, the Confederate
drummer boy, was much more nationalistic, if that phrase carries the meaning I should like it to carry, was far more prone to find State action forbidden as an interference with federal power than was Holmes, the Union
soldier, who went to his death with three bullets in his body.
Of course in a sense each man finds what he sets out to look for, and Justice
Frankfurter likes to collect lore on the Court which vindicates his belief that
"[F]or judges, it is not merely a desirable capacity
'to emancipate their purpose'
12
from their private desires; it is their duty."
To compare Frankfurter's insistence on maintaining a tense but impregnable
wall between the private opinions of a judge as a man and his opinions as a judge
with the complacent world of Mr. Justice David Brewer is an interesting study
in contrasts. Professor Westin treats us to a fascinating address given by Mr. Justice
Brewer to the New York State Bar Association in 1893. Now, seventy years later,

when we think of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, phrases
like civil rights and desegregation rush instantly to the mind. But in the gilded
6
7
8
9

Id. at 38.
See 3 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 97 (ist ed. 1922).
Text at 3.
Id. at 178.
10 Freund, Umpiring the FederalSystem, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 561, 574 (1954).
11 Text at 219.
12 Id. at 275.
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age, the "nation's safeguard," as Brewer, in characteristic rococo style, dubbed the
Constitution, was oriented not to individual or minority rights but to the new
industrialism which had transformed the country since the Civil War. If anything is typical of the vanished heyday of substantive due process, the selection
by Justice Brewer comes as close to being as representative as possible. The fol-

lowing hymn to railroad corporations was delivered by Justice Brewer to the
New York Bar Association:"
The property of a great railroad corporation stretches far away from the
domicile of its owner, through State after State, from ocean to ocean; the
rain and the snow may cover it; the winds and the storms may wreck it; but
no man or multitude dare touch a car or move a rail. It stands as secure in
the eye and in the custody of the law, as the purposes of justice in the
thought of God.
Reading a collection like this, which pushes together in one volume the

qualities of men as disparate as Frankfurter and Brewer, familiar doctrine takes
on new meaning. The Supreme Court of the United States, unlike courts dealing
chiefly with questions of private law, has been unable to follow stare decisis with
that disciplined vigor which has always characterized the English courts, and
until recently, even American courts such as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Professor Westin has thus quite appropriately included an essay by Justice
Douglas on stare decisis.
That the Supreme Court is a political as well as a legal institution may be
the beginning of wisdom in understanding American constitutional law. But to
let it remain the end of wisdom is to confuse sophistication with cynicism. When
students confront the history of the federal commerce power and trace it from
John Marshall to Roger Taney to Harlan Stone, they watch, first fascinated and
then repelled, as it becomes clear that the Court first expanded the commerce
power, then contracted it, and then expanded it once again. The answer to the
historical fact of alternate contraction and expansion of the federal commerce
power, the student says, is not to be found either in distinguishing nonconforming
cases or in showing by careful legal reasoning fatal errors in opinions that have
been reversed. The answer, says the disillusioned student, lies not in law but in
politics. But in constitutional litigation, law is necessarily as much an inconstant as

politics. The rejoinder quickly comes: if that is the case, when then should the
Court do homage to stare decisis at all? Justice Douglas's reply merits quotation
because it is so directly responsive to this honest and impatient cry from the heart:' 4
We can get from those who preceded a sense of the continuity of a
society. We can draw from their learning a feel for the durability of doctrine and a sense of the origin of principles. But we have experience that
they never knew. Our vision may be shorter or longer. But it is ours. It is
better that we make our history than be governed by the dead. We too
must be dynamic components of history if our institutions are to be vital,
directive forces in the life of our age.
Something is provided in this book of the richness, the variety, the ever-present
sense of battle furnished by the competing social values whose continual combat
is presented to the Court for equally continuing arbitrage. As Holmes said of the
Court, tersely but completely as was his manner: "'we are very quiet there, but
it is the quiet of a storm centre.' "'5 In the sense that this collection captures
something of this abiding quality of tension it is successful. Its weakness is that
as a panoramic study the present has been overemphasized at the expense of the

past.

13 Id. at 123.
14 Id. at 331.
15 Id. at 199.
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